

Actually it’s spelled Turkïye now


Actually it’s spelled Turkïye now


In return they get an actually secure messing app they can use without having to support it themselves. Which is pretty big.
I thought land of the free and home of the brave was Scotland


https://blog.giovanh.com/blog/2025/10/14/a-hack-is-not-enough/ this article makes a sadly excellent point in response to you here. Fair warning: it’s long. But even if you dip out early I assume you’ll get the point being made


Oh well that’s depressing. I last interviewed about 3 years ago and I guess it might well have changed overall. OTOH I get to run the interviews where I’m at now and I can assure you that ‘actually using your available resources’ would never be a problem :)


We let people use chatbots in our technical interview and don’t even mark down for it, since they’re a tool that exists.
I have yet to see a candidate who uses chatbots be anywhere near as good at producing good solutions quickly as the ones who don’t.
Just one of the many perks of a stable monogamous relationship.


A website set up by an unknown Dane
The website, called Fight Chat Control, was set up by Joachim, a 30-year-old software engineer living in Aalborg, Denmark.
Does anyone fucking proof-read anything any more? Or does unknown just mean ‘not famous’ these days? FML.
Right. Exactly my point? Phone numbers are not, like, the only way to identify a user. You have to know who they are. You posted an xkcd but failed to derive the conclusion that if a user is ‘compromised’ and they know who they’re talking to, then so are the people they’re talking to, regardless of whether phone numbers are involved. There’s no practical way to mitigate against that, it becomes a paranoid’s nightmare.
Ok but a messaging app that doesn’t let you know who a message is from is completely pointless? I feel like you’re not really addressing this issue here
No the most important thing a chat app needs to do is send messages between the intended recipients making them available to anyone else. Signal does this. You’re worried about ppl receiving messages and knowing who they’re from. Generally knowing where a message is from is considered a feature – if you want anonymous broadcast, pick a different technology that’s geared towards that
If your threat model is deanonymisation of chat users via phone numbers after one chat is fully compromised, then yeah I guess you need to register the accounts with relatively ‘untracable’ phone numbers (ie unregistered or incorrectly registered burner sims), but that’s not my threat model. I’m more concerned about server-side broad-spectrum government surveillance than I am about targeted device seizures. And of course there are mitigations even with data access on device seizure, provided you’re unwilling to provide device passwords. But, like, if you’re cooperating to the point of providing passwords you’re probably sharing what you know about other users identities anyway, so it’s a very niche case this applies to.
Does it really? Iirc, you can determine: when the account was made, and when the last message was sent. This doesn’t sound ‘highly vulnerable’ to me… Doesn’t permit inspection of metadata e.g. contacts, so as vulnerabilities go it’s pretty weak sauce
What are you referring to? I’ve read many security breakdowns of signal and nobody who knows what they’re talking about has ever mentioned a back door


Is ASAP Linux a variant of Asahi that I’m not hip enough to get?
I remember Linus saying in an interview that he’d only really been involved in git for the first 6 months or so and that the other devs had managed it without him since then. This makes sense - Linus’s creations aren’t successful because he’s the only person who understands them, they’re successful because there are so many other collaborators on them.
Ontario pretty obviously doesn’t have a romance etymology my dude