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Cake day: June 3rd, 2025

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  • I thought about this too, but I think you’d still be charged (IANAL).

    If you look at what he was charged with:

    Tunick was charged because he allegedly “did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take said property into its custody and control.”

    So, even if you nuked your phone before going through security or even at home before your flight, I imagine you could still be prosecuted for “knowingly… delete the digital contents… for the purpose of preventing… lawful authorities to take said property into its custody”.

    It’s all based on your intent behind the action and this is what the prosecution and defense would argue.

    edit: typo



  • And would you look at that suddenly we have TOTP that I can’t write myself and I’m forced to use some shitty app.

    I think our definition of what TOTP is, differs. When I say TOTP, I mean TOTP as defined as a standard in RFC 6238.

    The behaviour you’re describing with duo is something else, something proprietary. In my mind, duo would be an One Time Password (OTP).

    sidenote: TOTP is a specific/narrow implementation of the larger umbrella OTP.

    It’s about open standard compliance.

    Maybe I’m getting hung-up on semantics, but attestation is an open standard, like gpg is. With gpg you can implement your own encryption/decryption according to the gpg specification and your encrypted data will still be safe because you’re trusting the math behind the Asymmetrical Encryption.

    Attestation is identical, but at the hardware level. The public/private keys are created by the hardware manufacturer. The private key is (often) isolated and stored in the CPU (or in a dedicated chip). The public key is freely published, so OS/application vendors know how to validate that an attestation response wasn’t faked. The private key is not exposed and even if it were, the public key could be revoked by the OS/application.

    Attestation is great for device level security, but makes it nearly impossible to create backups/clones. :(


  • LedgeDrop@lemmy.ziptoPrivacy@lemmy.ml•Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them
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    1 month ago

    So in order to log into most websites, you need your username/email address and a password.

    You can save your username/password in your web browser or in the cloud.

    Sometimes people get lazy and reuse passwords, sometimes people forget their passwords.

    Passkey is a replacement for usernames/passwords. It does require that the passkey is saved somewhere, often on your device (in the cloud is possible, but non-standard).

    When you “create” a passkey, this passkey is used only at a single place. For example, you’d have a passkey for your bank, another one for your email, another one for Lemmy. You have no say in the matter, that’s just how it works.

    When you log into a website that has passkey enabled, your passkey/password manager pops up, you click on the passkey and that’s it. There is no email address, there is no password, no MFA.

    edit: oh, you also asked about the difference between passwords.

    It’s all about improved security.

    You go to certain websites, and they’ll only allow a-zA-Z0-9, others require a minimum length of 8 characters, needs 3 symbols (except ! for whatever reason ;)

    Then you have no idea how the website is storing your password. Are they encrypting it? Did they do it correctly?

    If you look at the number of “breached/leaked” passwords on the internet, it’s because it’s hard to securely store passwords.

    Passkey solves all this. Websites are just given “a public key” and it can be “just stored”, no special treatment necessary.


  • Both also have the same potential for abuse, any service could require you use their specific app.

    That’s not true. TOTP is just a mathematical formula for how you mix a “shared secret/seed” with the current time.

    In the authors article, they mention that you could write your own python program to generate the correct rotating numbers.

    There is no way Big Tech could force you to use a specific app, because at the end of the day, TOTP is just math. 1+1=2, that could be calculated by you, your cellphone, or me - it doesn’t matter.

    According to the article, Passkeys, on the other hand include a bunch of metadata. For example, can this passkey be copied or moved to another device.

    The article is also very clear that all those fields can be faked except attestation.

    And for those at home, attestation is a cryptographically secure way for an application to be certain that the application, operating system, and hardware are not modified to work in a way that the OS provider, application, and hardware vendor expect it to.

    This has been abused by google/android to prevent/limit people from installing applications outside of the google play store, its been uses to force people to only use google-approved os’ (no cfw, no grapheneos). The same technology is a requirement for windows 11 (TPM).

    Now, if FIDO agreed to not include attestation as part of the metadata - this would not be a discussion: everyone would love and use passkey, as you (the user) get to decide how to store/backup and (optionally) share this key.

    But that’s not what FIDO did, the attestation flag is included in the metadata. And the author speculates that once people accept passkey, Big Tech will turn the screws and then start to force how you store your passkeys.

    So, in an apocalyptic future “coming soon”, when you try to log onto your bank, you’ll be greeted with an error:

    “We detected that your passkey is stored in the cloud. Your security is important to us. Please, install your new passkey onto your local device using your manufacturers approved Google Android Operating System and Google Approved passkey application.”


  • In vaultwarden, they do appear in the web client. The behavior you’re describing hints that your passkeys are not being stored in bitwarden.

    …and tbh, the UX sucks pretty bad: I was trying to store a passkey in bitwarden, but it was failing (unrelated networking error). I had two options: add it to bitwarden (which failed) or cancel. I hit cancel and was prompted for my fingerprint, which I provided – this ended up storing it on my device… no input, no description of what it was doing. The website came back with “passkey now enabled” :facepalm:



  • I’ve already been avoiding them because I don’t see how there’s any security advantage over TOTP…

    I’m not going to challenge your choice in using passkey or not. However, I do want to set the “technical record straight”: passkey is the successor to TOTP in every technical way*.

    TOTP works by having a “shared secret” saved by both you and the place that your authenticating against. This shared secret is then mixed with current time to generate a rotating number that the client shares with the remote server. The remote server does the same calculation, if the rotating numbers match, the user is successfully authenticated.

    With TOTP, this means that there are two attack vectors: your device and the remote server. If an attacker is successful in getting the “shared secret” from either, your TOTP is effectively broken.

    Passkey works more like ssh-keys. The client generates a public and private keypair. The client only shares the public portion with the remote server and stores the private key locally (or in your password manager).

    So the only attack vector (with passkey) is your device (this is often why it’s bundled with attestation). Also passkey is not dependant on both the client and server having their time kept in sync. With TOTP, if you have more than ~30 seconds drift between the client and server, they will be generating different rotating codes and never match (which is confusing when you need to explain this to your Grandma).

    • there is one thing TOTP can do, that passkey cannot: TOTP is 2FA, your TOTP can reside on a separate device (ie your phone when logging in using your PC). With passkey, you’d need to enable 2FA on the passkey manager (which varies from manager to manager).

    …unless the passkey is the only way to access the account (which would be awful for account recovery).

    Recovery options are never going to go away. With TOTP, you often have one-time use backup codes. Email, SMS recovery etc.




  • Hey, I’m glad you found the information helpful.

    If you decide to use your own avb custom keys (meaning that you are the only person who can install cfw - this means that google, graphene, etc would fail to install as they aren’t signed with your keys).

    You can then use tools like Custota to allow you to have/distribute your OTA (over-the-air) cfw updates.

    Why would you want to do this?

    Well, for sometime I was running a rooted version of graphene w/ magisk (as I wanted “real” offline backups). This means that I needed to “sign” each release and the official graphene updates. The process was a bit tedious, but well documented.

    The upshot of custota being installed on my device, was that I got a notification when I had a new self-signed update available… and the release/install process was entirely under my control. …and if something borked, I could “rollback” to the previous version (tbh, nothing did bork, so I didn’t actually need to try this).




  • AFAIK, the only way you can reliably lock your bootloader with a custom firmware, is if the device allows you to upload new avb_custom_keys. This basically allows you change your locked bootloader to allow custom firmware from a single (signed) source (ie graphene, google, your own).

    I can’t say for certain, but many non-pixel phones do not support this.

    So, if you were to lock your bootloader, the loader would notice that you have an “unauthorized” firmware installed and would not run it. You’d basically need to unlock the bootloader again, but I think Motorola has made this process more complicated. Meaning you might need a bootable device to do it.

    As far as security: Unlocked phones are less secure. All android devices are encrypted, using a hardware key plus your pin number. When a device is locked, a “secure key” is used as the hardware key. When a device is unlocked “another key” is used. If an attacker gets a hold of your unlocked encrypted phone, they can easily get this “other hardware key” which means they already have 1/2 of the information needed to decrypt your phone.

    Afterwards, the only thing protecting your unlock phone is the strength of your pin (which is trivial to brute force). On locked bootloaders, it’s much more difficult, as they’d need to figure out the “secure key”, in addition to your pin.



  • I’d asked a similar question. Basically, the response I got was: if the something goes sideways, the community can hard fork all their clients and use vaultwarden as a server (their current licenses would allow that).

    Another suggestion was that you can always use the web ui bundled with vaultwarden directly (heh, I’ve been using vaultwarden for years and I don’t think I ever used the web ui - just the applications, CLI, browser extension).



  • They’re two sides of the same coin. Can’t have privacy without security and can’t have security without privacy.

    Hmmm… I half agree with what you said. The corner stone of most security is an element of initial trust.

    With SSL, we’re trusting that the certificate authority is valid.

    With tools like GPG, I (as the sender) are trusting that the key I’m using to sign a message is really yours.

    With Android we (the users) and the application developers are trusting Google (hence why “sideloading” is now “bad”, because Google says it is).

    I absolutely agree that privacy cannot exist without security. But, your privacy is dependent on who your security model trusts.

    I don’t trust Google with my privacy (hence, I degoogle) , but my bank app doesn’t trust my security (hence, the app can only be installed via Google Play).

    So, privacy is dependent on security, but security is built on trust.


  • I do use a (modded) version of graphene as a daily driver and I do appreciate many of the features that it offer.

    And I totally agree that some people seem to try to turn graphene into some rigid cult (especially on the philosophy of running root and “who decides how application backup should be made? The application developer or the device/data owner”)

    That said:

    the idea that the only way I can not get assraped on the reg is to give a shitload of money to google and then use this elitist OS is something I have a gigantic problem with.

    There is actually a technical reason for this. Pixel phones are the only ones to support custom AvB keys.

    Basically, this allows you (or graphene) to create a key, which can be used to sign your custom firmware. So, you can have a locked bootloader that will only allow OS updates signed with your key.

    You can basically create your own OTA updates. It’s fantastic.

    It’s amazing and disappointing that most phone manufacturers don’t allow custom AvB keys, but it’s a reflection of how they truly don’t care about people who like to tinker.

    Now, should the lack of custom AvB keys be a barrier towards using graphene? Tbh, I don’t think so - but it does fit the graphene rigid MO of “root is bad”.

    edit : fixed link